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3 See note, supra n. 1.
4 See, e.g., Pyle v. United States, 766 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
5 See Pyle v. United States, n. 4 supra.
6 Pyle v. United States, n. 4 supra (significant constraints
imposed on freedom of surviving spouse to dispose of
property); Grimes v. Comm'r, 851 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir.
1988).
7 Estate of Lidbury v. Comm’r, 800 F.2d 649 (7th Cir.
1986), aff'g, 84 T.C. 146 (1985).
8 Hambleton v. Comm’r, 60 T.C. 558, 565 (1973), acq. in
result, 1974-1 C.B. 1.
9 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(a).
10 Estate of Awtry v. Comm’r, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir.
1955).  See Ford v. United States, 377 F.2d 93 (8th Cir.
1967) (joint tenancy property and life insurance
proceeds).
11 Ford v. United States, supra n. 10.
12 Estate of Grimes v. Comm’r, 91-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 60,078
(7th Cir. 1991) (under Illinois law, survivor under joint
and mutual will receives only equivalent of life estate);
Ltr. Rul. 9023004, February 20, 1990 (Texas law); Ltr.
Rul. 9101002, September 20, 1990 (surviving spouse
had mere life estate).
13 Ltr. Rul. 94350014, June 2, 1994.
14 See I.R.C. § 2032A.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AMENDMENTS. At the time of the bankruptcy
petition, the debtor was a plaintiff in a personal injury
action but the debtor did not list the action on the
bankruptcy asset schedules nor did the debtor claim the
action as an exemption. Once the trustee learned about the
action, the trustee retained counsel to litigate the action and
eventually settled the case for a cash award. The debtor then
filed an amendment to the exemptions to include the
proceeds of the settlement as exempt. The trustee argued
that once the trustee had liquidated an estate asset, the
debtor could not claim the asset as exempt. The court held
that the debtor could claim the proceeds of the settlement as
exempt but that the trustee would be allowed to deduct the
cost of procuring the settlement. In re Fournier, 169 B.R.
282 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN. The debtor owned a one-fourth interest in a
ranch as a tenant in common. The other interests were held
by nondebtors, the debtor’s mother and sister. The ranch
was operated by the owners as a partnership. The owners
were comakers of a loan from the SBA, secured by two
mortgages on the ranch which did not exceed the fair
market value of the entire ranch. The SBA filed a claim in
the debtor’s case for the entire amount owed. The Chapter
12 plan provided for the SBA to retain its first lien position
on a portion of the land but subordinated the lien as to
another portion of the land to a judgment lien held by
another creditor. The debtor argued that the SBA loan was
oversecured because the value of the claim was only one-
third of the fair market value of the ranch. The court held
that the determination of the secured status of the SBA
claim was to be made using only the value of the debtor’s
interest in the ranch. Because the claim was at least equal to
the debtor’s interest in the ranch, the SBA claim was not
oversecured and any change in the SBA claim made by the
plan would impair the claim impermissably under Section
1225(a)(5). In re Beach, 169 B.R. 201 (D. Kan. 1994).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
PROPERTY TAXES. The Chapter 13 debtor owned
real property in Maryland against which real estate taxes
became first due during the bankruptcy case. The real estate
taxes were prospective, i.e., the 1994-1995 taxes became
first due on July 1, 1994. The debtor’s plan did not provide
for payment of the taxes and had not been confirmed when
the county filed a claim for the taxes after July 1, 1994. The
court noted that had no claim been filed, the taxes were a
post-petition claim not required to be paid under the plan
and would not be dischargeable. In addition, the court noted
that if the tax claim had not been filed, the taxes could have
been assessed against the debtor as soon as the plan was
confirmed and the real property reverted to the debtor.
However, because the county filed a claim for taxes arising
post-petition, under Section 1305, the tax claim was to be
treated as having arisen pre-petition and allowed as a claim,
was subject to the automatic stay and was subject to
discharge. Baffled as to why the county would subject its
tax claim to these limitations, the court allowed the county
to clarify its filing or withdraw it. In re Reamy, 169 B.R.
352 (Bankr. D. Md. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
   CLAIMS. The IRS filed a priority claim for employment
taxes and an unsecured claim for penalties nine months after
the bar date for filing claims in the Chapter 7 case. The
trustee objected to the claims as untimely filed. The court
held that priority tax claims need only be filed pre-
distribution to be allowed in Chapter 7 cases unless the
claimant was guilty of inequitable conduct but that the
unsecured claim would not be allowed because it was
untimely filed. The court also held that the failure of the
IRS to timely file the claim was not inequitable because the
debtor did not provide its employment identification
number with the notice of the case to the IRS. In re Bunce,
169 B.R. 355 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1994).
The debtor filed a Chapter 7 case and listed federal
employment tax claims. Notice of the case and the bar date
for filing claims was sent to the IRS but not the U.S.
Attorney’s office. The IRS failed to file a claim until after
the claims bar date and the trustee sought to disallow the
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claims as untimely filed. The IRS argued that the notice was
defective because notice was not sent to the U.S. Attorney’s
office and that an extension of the time to file the claim
should be allowed because the debtor had not filed a return
as to the taxes involved. The court held that where a claim
involved only taxes, the U.S. Attorney’s office need not
receive a notice and that the debtor’s listing of the
employment tax claim on its bankruptcy schedules was
sufficient notice to the IRS of the claim.  In addition, the
court held that an extension could be granted only if applied
for before the claims bar date. The IRS claim was allowed
but was placed in the last priority, after all timely filed
unsecured claims were paid. In re Larry Merritt Co., 169
B.R. 141 (E.D. Tenn. 1994), aff’g, 166 B.R. 875 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1993).
The debtors filed for Chapter 7 and the IRS filed a claim
for 1988 and 1989 taxes. The trustee filed an objection to
the claims because the taxes were already paid. The IRS did
not respond to the objection and the claim was disallowed.
The case was closed in June 1992. In June 1993, the IRS
filed a notice of intent to levy for taxes owed for 1988 and
1989 and proceeded to execute offsets and levies against the
debtors’ property. The debtor sought a reopening of the case
and an injunction against further levies, arguing that the
disallowance of the IRS claim in the case barred collection
of the taxes. The court held that the disallowance of the tax
claim did not litigate the dischargeability of the taxes
involved; therefore, the taxes were not discharged and the
IRS was not barred from assessment and collection of the
claim. The court noted that the only effect of the
disallowance was to exclude the IRS from distributions
from the bankruptcy estate. In re Horn, 169 B.R. 218
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1994).
DISCHARGE. The debtor did not timely file the 1982
federal income tax return and the court found that the late
filing was a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax, making
the taxes owed nondischargeable under Section
523(a)(1)(C). The IRS had also assessed interest on the
1982 taxes and sought a determination that the interest was
also nondischargeable.  The court held that the interest for
unpaid taxes was part of the claim for the taxes and was
nondischargeable where the taxes were nondischargeable
under Section 523(a)(1)(C). In re Leahey, 169 B.R. 96
(Bankr. D. N.J. 1994).
DISMISSAL . The debtor filed for Chapter 13 in
December 1993. At the Section 341 meeting of creditors in
January 1994, the debtor acknowledged that the income tax
returns for 1987 through 1992 had not been filed nor the
taxes paid. The trustee filed an objection to confirmation of
the debtor’s plan, alleging that the debtor’s failure to file the
tax returns violated the good faith requirements of Section
1325. At the May 1994 hearing on the objection, the debtor
also acknowledged that the 1993 tax return had not yet been
filed and that none of the past returns had been filed. The
court held that the failure to file 1987 through 1993 federal
income tax returns or even an attempt to file during the
bankruptcy case demonstrated a lack of good faith by the
debtor. The case was dismissed. Matter of Crayton, 169
243 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).
RETURNS. The bankruptcy trustee filed the estate’s
federal income tax return with the IRS service center and
requested an expedited determination under 11 U.S.C. §
505(b)(1). The IRS did not respond to the request within 60
days after the return was filed and the trustee sought a
determination that the estate, trustee and debtor were
discharged from any other taxes. The IRS argued that
Section 505(b)(1) requests are required to be filed with the
District Director with attention marked to the Special
Procedures Unit. See Rev. Proc. 81-17, 1981-1 C.B. 688.
The trustee argued that the filing of the request with the
return complied with the statute in that it provided sufficient
notice to the governmental unit with responsibility for
assessing and collecting the tax involved. The court held
that the 60 day period had not run because the trustee did
not comply with the expedited determination requirements
of the revenue procedure which established long-standing
and clear requirements consistent with the statutory
purposes. The IRS had also argued that Section 505(c)
allowed assessment of additional taxes even after the
expedited determination had been requested because
Section 505(c) allowed assessments after Bankruptcy Court
determinations. The court held that such an interpretation of
Section 505(c) would negate the effects of Section
505(b)(1); therefore, the court held that if the requirements
of Section 505(b)(1) had been met, the IRS was barred,
unless one of the exceptions in Section 505(b) applied, from
assessing additional taxes after the 60 day period passed. In
re Flattery, 169 B.R. 267 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1994).
CONTRACTS
CONTRACT FOR GOODS AND SERVICES. A
third party had purchased a combine and leased the combine
to a farming company. The plaintiff purchased the combine
and accompanying lease using the defendant as broker for
the transaction. The plaintiff used another company to
manage the lease. After the lessee defaulted on the lease,
the plaintiff sued the defendant broker, alleging that the
defendant had misrepresented the lessee’s guarantees for the
lease payments. The defendant argued that the action was
barred by the four year statute of limitations under the
U.C.C.  the plaintiff argued that the U.C.C. did not apply
because the contract was for services in that the plaintiff
was not a farmer, the other parties involved were in the
business of putting together lease packages, and the purpose
of the transaction was to provide a stream of income. The
court found that the contract involved both goods and
services and applied the “predominant purpose” test to hold
that the contract was predominantly for goods because the
plaintiff became the owner of the combine and the services
provided by the other companies facilitated the sale of the
combine. Therefore, the U.C.C. four year statute of
limitations applied to bar the plaintiff’s action. Vesta State
Bank v. Independent State Bank, 518 N.W.2d 850
(Minn. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2][g].* The
plaintiffs were indebted to the FmHA on a loan secured by
real property which was subject to a first mortgage with a
third party. The plaintiffs defaulted on the first mortgage
and the third party foreclosed on the property, selling it at
148                                                                                                                                                               Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
auction. The FmHA was granted a one-year redemption
right for the property. The plaintiffs negotiated a settlement
with the FmHA for satisfaction of the debt for cash with the
plaintiffs to receive the remaining redemption rights.
However, after receiving the money, the FmHA filed a
waiver of the redemption rights, effectively cutting off the
plaintiffs’ right of redemption. The plaintiffs sued the
FmHA for negligence in failing to transfer the redemption
right, conversion and tortious breach of contract.  The court
held that the plaintiffs’ actions were all based on breach of
contract, actions which were under the jurisdiction of the
Court of Federal Claims. The court also held that the claim
of conversion was dismissed because the FmHA did not
acquire any rights from the plaintiffs. The court also held
that the action for tortious breach of contract was dismissed
because the plaintiffs identified no duty violated by the
FmHA outside of the contract. The breach of contract action
was transferred to the Court of Federal Claims. Wolf v.
U.S., 855 F. Supp. 337 (D. Kan. 1994).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.* The FCIC has
issued an interim final rule providing that the continuation
of crop insurance policies reinsured by the FCIC are subject
to the availability of appropriations. The FCIC noted that
although legislation is pending for funding of the 1995
federal crop insurance program, the fall planted crop
cancellation date is approaching. 59 Fed. Reg. 45971 (Sept.
6, 1994).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiff was injured
by organophosphate poisoning from exposure to malathion
manufactured by the defendant and sprayed on the
plaintiff’s neighborhood by the State of California as part of
the Medfly spraying program. The issue involved was
whether the defendant had a duty to properly warn the
public about the pesticide once the defendant learned that
the applicator, California, had given false, misleading and
inadequate warnings about exposure to the spraying. The
plaintiffs did not allege that the pesticide label failed to
provide adequate warnings; indeed, the label indicated that
the pesticide was not to be used for public spraying, but
California had obtained a special permit from the EPA. The
trial court had granted the defendant summary judgment
because the defendant’s reliance on the warning given by an
elected representative of the public was reasonable. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant had a
duty to provide proper warnings to persons who would be
exposed to the pesticide; therefore, issues of fact remained
as to whether the warnings given by California were
adequate, whether the defendant had knowledge of any
inaccurate warnings and whether, given knowledge of
inaccurate warnings, the defendant’s reliance on the state of
California was reasonable. The court also held that the
action was not preempted by FIFRA because FIFRA did not
expressly preempt an action for failure to warn where the
applicator’s warnings did not comply with the information
contained on the pesticide label. Macias v. State, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
taxpayer created a charitable remainder unitrust with the
taxpayer as income beneficiary for life. The trust provided
that the income beneficiary was to receive annually the
lesser of trust net income or 5 percent of the net fair market
value of the trust assets as of the first day of the tax year. If
trust income exceeded the 5 percent figure, additional
income could be distributed to the extent amounts
distributed in previous years did not equal the 5 percent
amount. The trustee’s usual procedure was to charge for
administrative costs at the termination of the trust but
decided to start charging the trust each year for the
expenses. The IRS ruled that under state law, administrative
costs were to be included in determining trust income;
therefore, the trustee’s annual assessment of administrative
costs did not disqualify  the trust for the charitable
deduction. Ltr. Rul. 94340018, May 26, 1994.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01. The decedent made several gifts by
checks dated, delivered and deposited in December 1985.
However, the checks were not paid by the drawee bank until
January 1986. The court held that the date of the gifts was
in 1985 under the relation back doctrine which applied in
this case because the checking account had sufficient funds
at all times to cover the checks and the checks were
unconditionally delivered to the donees who cashed the
checks within a reasonable period of time and in the same
year as the year the checks were delivered.  Est. of Metzger
v. Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,179 (4th Cir.
1994), aff’g, 100 T.C. 204 (1993).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s will’s residuary clause contained two provisions.
The first provision devised equal shares of the residuary
estate to the decedent’s children in the total amount equal to
the maximum unified credit reduced by other specific
bequests. The second provision provided that all property
not distributed in the first provision passed to the surviving
spouse in trust. The estate representative elected QTIP
treatment for the marital trust. The will also provided that
all estate, inheritance and death taxes imposed on the
decedent’s estate were to be paid from the residuary estate
without reimbursement. The IRS ruled that the two
provisions were part of the residuary bequests but that
because the first provision provided for a specific sum
bequest, it would be treated as a pre-residuary bequest and
would not be diminished by estate or inheritance taxes. The
IRS also ruled that because the marital trust bequest was not
limited but would receive all property not otherwise
devised, the marital bequest consisted of the residuary estate
and would be first reduced by all estate and inheritance
taxes, thus also reducing the amount of the trust eligible for
the marital deduction. The IRS noted that the amount of the
marital deduction would be determined using an interrelated
computation.  Ltr. Rul. 9434004, May 4, 1994.
The surviving spouse received income interests in three
trusts established by the decedent’s will. The estate made a
QTIP election of at least a portion of each of the trusts.
After the estate tax return was filed, the surviving spouse
transferred the income interest in one of the trusts to the
remainder holder by gift. The IRS ruled that the transfer did
not affect the estate’s marital deduction. The IRS noted that
the transfer of the income interest would also be deemed a
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transfer of the remainder interest under I.R.C. § 2519. Ltr.
Rul. 9434029, May 31, 1994.
UNIFIED CREDIT.  The decedent’s will’s residuary
clause devised equal shares of the residuary estate to the
decedent’s children in the total amount of estate property
which would produce the maximum unified credit, reduced
by other pre-residuary will bequests. The decedent’s gross
estate included nonprobate property, including the proceeds
of an insurance policy and adjusted taxable gifts. The IRS
ruled that because the nonprobate transfers included in the
gross estate made the gross estate exceed $600,000, the
calculation of the residuary bequest would be equal to the
amount which would produce a tax of $192,800 under the
progressive rate structure of the federal estate tax, reduced
by the other specified bequests.  Ltr. Rul. 9434004, May 4,
1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS
SMALL BUSINESS STOCK. Under existing
regulations, an owner of Section 1244 stock could not claim
an ordinary loss deduction for the stock unless the owner
has filed an information statement with the tax return for the
tax year in which the loss deduction is claimed. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.1244(e)-1(b); Magee v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-305. The IRS has announced that it will be revising
the regulations to remove the information filing
requirement; however, a taxpayer claiming a Section 1244
ordinary loss will be required to maintain records sufficient
to establish that the stock qualified as Section 1244 stock.
Notice 94-89, I.R.B. 1994-38.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayers sued a utility company for
negligence arising from a gas explosion and damage to their
house. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive
damages without allocating the punitive damages between
the property  damage and the personal injury awards.
Under pre-1989 law, the court held that because the
underlying suit was a personal injury tort case, the punitive
damages were excludible from income. Horton v.
Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,440 (6th Cir.
1994), aff’g, 100 T.C. 93 (1993).
The taxpayer was an airline pilot forced to retire at age
60. The taxpayer brought suit against the airline under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The
parties  reached a settlement which provided that a portion
of the settlement was for back pay and a portion was for
liquidated damages. The Tax Court held that all of the
settlement payment was excludible from the taxpayer’s
income because the ADEA provided tort-like remedies. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the ADEA did not
provide a tort-like cause of action because the ADEA did
not provide for damages to compensate the plaintiff for the
“intangible elements of injury essential to a personal injury
tort action.”   Downey v. Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,441 (7th Cir. 1994), rev’g, 100 T.C. 634
(1993).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-A L M §
4.02[15].* The taxpayer had operated a beef farm with her
spouse until his death. The couple was indebted to the
FmHA for loans secured by the farm property. After the
death of the husband, the taxpayer sold the livestock and
farm machinery. The taxpayer then leased the farmland to a
third party under a cash lease and received Wisconsin
Farmland Preservation Act credits because the farm was in
an exclusive agricultural use zone. The taxpayer obtained a
debt restructuring from the FmHA which included a
cancelation of part of the loan principal and all of the
accrued interest. The FmHA sent the taxpayer a Form 1099-
G which listed the amount of discharge of indebtedness
received by the taxpayer from the debt restructuring. The
taxpayer argued that the proceeds of the sale of the
machinery and livestock, the rent and the state credits were
included in farm income such that for the three previous tax
years, more than 50 percent of the taxpayer’s income came
from farming; therefore, the debt was qualified farm
indebtedness and the entire discharge of indebtedness
income was not includible in gross income. The court held
that the proceeds of the sale of livestock and farm
machinery were included in gross receipts from farming
because the property was part of the farm operation;
however, because the cash rent and state credits arose when
the taxpayer was no longer actively engaged in farming,
those items were not included in gross receipts from
farming. Because the taxpayer’s gross receipts from
farming, as determined by the court, did not exceed 50
percent of the aggregate gross receipts, the taxpayer could
only exclude from gross income the amount of discharge of
indebtedness income equal to the amount of the taxpayer’s
insolvency at the time of the discharge. Lawinger v.
Comm’r, 103 T.C. No. 23 (1994).
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period October 1, 1994 through December 31, 1994, the
interest rate paid on tax overpayments has been increased to
8 percent and for underpayments to 9 percent. The interest
rate for underpayments by large corporations increased to
11 percent. Rev. Rul. 94-58, I.R.B 1994-39.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.04 . The
taxpayer was not allowed investment tax credit for the
buildings that housed a car wash because the buildings were
not an inherent part of the car washing machinery since the
machinery could be replaced without replacing the
buildings. Schrum v. Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,451 (4th Cir. 1994), aff’g on point, T.C. Memo.
1993-124.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. A general
partnership with individuals and one personal service
corporation as members converted to a Limited Liability
Company (LLC) with all partners contributing their
partnership interests to the LLC. All of the members were
actively engaged in the business and all had the power to
manage the company. The LLC expected no years of losses
and no LLC interest would be offered for sale to the general
public. The state LLC act and the LLC agreement provided
that, upon a terminating event, the LLC could be continued
only with the consent of all of the remaining members. The
LLC act also provided that a member could transfer an
150                                                                                                                                                               Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
interest in the LLC but that the transferee of the member’s
interest had no right to participate in the management of the
LLC without the unanimous consent of the other members.
The LLC interests were not subject to registration under
state or federal law. The IRS ruled that the LLC would be
taxed as a partnership because the LLC lacked the corporate
characteristics of continuity of life and free transferability
of interests. The IRS also ruled that the conversion of the
partnership to an LLC did not cause any recognition of gain
or loss and that the LLC could use the cash method of
accounting since the LLC interests were not registered, the
LLC was not a tax shelter (so long as the LLC had a bona
fide business purpose, a fact issue not ruled upon by the IRS
in advance determination letters), and all members actively
participated in the management of the LLC business. Ltr.
Rul. 9434027, May 31, 1994.
LOSSES. The taxpayers were investors in a limited
partnership which obtained licenses for enhanced oil
recovery technology and for the lease of tar sands
properties. The taxpayers were denied deductions resulting
from the investments because the taxpayers did not have a
profit motive for the investments since (1) the debts of the
partnership were not bona fide arm’s-length transactions,
(2) excessive amounts were paid for the oil recovery
technology, and (3) the debts were not genuine obligations
of the partnership or investors. Hildebrand v. Comm’r, 28
F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994), aff’g, 99 T.C. 132 (1992).
RETURNS. The IRS has issued guidance for individual
taxpayers who are paying in three installments the
additional 1993 taxes enacted by OBRA 1993. The revenue
procedure provides guidance for payment of the second and
third installments. Rev. Proc. 94-58, I.R.B. 1994-38.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer was an S corporation
operating a law office with two equal shareholders who
were the taxpayer’s only attorneys providing legal services.
The shareholders were also employed part-time by a county
as prosecutors. The taxpayer distributed periodic equal
“dividend” amounts to the shareholders but the total annual
distributions were less than the taxable income of the
corporation. However, one shareholder contributed 50
percent of the time to the taxpayer’s business and the other
shareholder contibuted only 10 percent of time to the
taxpayer’s business. The shareholders received no wages
from the taxpayer. The taxpayer owned the office space and
office equipment. One shareholder provided all of the
management duties for the taxpayer. The IRS argued that
the dividend payments were actually wages subject to FICA
and FUTA withholding. The taxpayer argued that the
payments were dividends because the distributions were
irregular and based on each shareholder’s share of the
corporation and the payments were consistently treated as
dividends. The court held that the payments were wages
because the corporation had no other persons who provided
legal services for the corporation’s business, those services
created al of the corporation’s income, and the shareholders
provided all of the management services.  Dunn & Clark,
P.A. v. Comm’r, 853 F. Supp. 365 (D. Idaho 1994).
TRAVEL EXPENSES . I.R.C. § 274(h) disallows
deductions for expenses incurred in connection with
conventions, seminars or similar meetings held outside of
the “North American Area.” The IRS has issued an updated
list of the states, possessions and countries included in the
“North American Area” for purposes of Section 274(h).
Rev. Rul. 94-56, I.R.B. 1994-36, 10.
PARTNERSHIPS
DISSOLUTION.  The parties were father and son who
were partners in a partnership which operated various
farming enterprises. The court found that the partners had
unreconcilable differences as to the partnership and that
court ordered dissolution was warranted. When the father’s
spouse died, her community property interest in the father’s
partnership interest passed to a trust for the father and the
children. The court ruled that the trust was not a partner
because the trust never became bound to the partnership
agreement. The court held that the partnership accounting
records were adequate in that the records were maintained
by an independent professional accounting firm and the
partners never objected to the annual reports. The remainder
of the case involved factual determinations as to the
partners’ respective share of partnership property,
distributions and contributions. Walker v. Walker, 854 F.
Supp. 1443 (D. Neb. 1994).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
TRACTOR. The insured’s farm tractor was destroyed
by an engine fire. The insured filed a claim with the
plaintiff insurance company and received reimbursement
for the purchase price less $50 deductible under the policy.
The plaintiff then brought an action in the insured’s name
against the manufacturer of the tractor, alleging that the
tractor was defective. The trial court granted the defendant’s
motion to substitute the plaintiff as the named plaintiff in
the case as the real party in interest. The appellate court
held that the trial court committed reversible error in that
the $50 deductible amount loss by the insured was sufficient
interest to use the insured as plaintiff. The plaintiff had sued
in strict liability and the defendant argued that an action in
strict liability could not be brought where the only damages
sustained were to the product. The court held that, although
most states do not allow strict liability actions involving
only product damage, Arkansas has strong precedent
allowing such actions. The court also upheld the jury
verdict for the plaintiff that the tractor was unreasonably
dangerous because the plaintiff had provided expert
testimony that the fire was caused by an improperly brazed
connection for the hydraulic lines. Farm Bureau Ins. Co.
v. Case Corp., 878 S.W.2d 741 (Ark. 1994).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY. The debtor borrowed money from the
plaintiff and granted a security interest in all crops growing,
stored and to be grown. The security interest was perfected
in 1990. The debtor contracted in August 1991 with the
defendant to sell 20,000 bushes of corn from the current
crop to be delivered in October. The plaintiff sent written
notice of its security interest in the corn to the defendant.
The debtor was also indebted to the defendant and after the
corn was delivered the defendant (1) issued a check to the
debtor and defendant, (2) cancelled that check and applied
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the proceeds to the debtor’s outstanding balance, and (3)
reissued a check to the debtor and plaintiff jointly but did
not deliver the check. The debtor filed for bankruptcy in
January 1992 and the defendant obtained a court order
allowing the debtor to borrow production expenses from the
defendant for the 1992 crop and granting the defendant a
priority security interest in the 1992 crop. That security
interest was perfected.  However, the bankruptcy case was
dismissed without a court order preserving the defendant’s
priority position. The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s
priority of the security interest in the 1992 crop was lost
when the bankruptcy case was dismissed. The court held
that, because the defendant’s bankruptcy-created security
interest was perfected under state law and the security
interest was granted for new value given more than six
months after the plaintiff’s loan was due and was given to
enable the debtor to produce the crop/collateral, the
defendant’s security interest had priority over the plaintiff’s
security interest. See Iowa Code § 554.9312(2). The
defendant also argued that it took possession of the 1991
crop free of the plaintiff’s security interest under Iowa Code
§ 554.9307(4)(a) as a buyer in the ordinary course of
business. The court held that Section 554.9307(4)(A) did
not apply because the defendant used the corn to satisfy an
existing debt of the debtor and the defendant had received
actual notice of the plaintiff’s security interest. Production
Credit Ass’n v. Farm & Town, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 339
(Iowa 1994).
REPOSSESSION-ALM § 13.01[6].*  After the plaintiff
defaulted on a loan, the defendant bank sent two employees
to repossess the farm equipment collateral for the loan. The
employees arrived when only the plaintiff’s twelve year old
son was present and moved a horse to the back of the barn
where the horse could reach more food than it should eat,
resulting in injury to the horse from colic. The employees
also moved a locked and braked truck, causing damage to
the land and the truck’s brakes. The employees took the
plaintiff’s tractor and a disc owned by the plaintiff’s
neighbor, breaking several blades in the process. After the
plaintiff paid the loan balance and the repossession costs,
the defendant bank refused to return the equipment unless
the plaintiff signed a release of the bank’s liability for
damages caused during the repossession. The plaintiff sued
for conversion for actual and punitive damages. The court
held that the bank was liable for criminal conversion in that
its employees committed criminal mischief in their
unreasonable injury to the plaintiff’s land, horse and
equipment in the repossession. The court held that the
failure of the bank to return the equipment after the plaintiff
paid the loan and costs was also conversion. The court also
held that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of
the value of the property involved and the amount of value
loss from the injury during repossession. The court upheld
the punitive damage award even though actual damages was
reversed, because the law allowed at least nominal damages
for criminal conversion. Star Bank, N.A. v. Laker, 637
N.E.2d 805 (Ind. 1994), aff’g, 626 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1993).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
COUNTY FAIRS. The plaintiff had entered a steer in a
county fair operated by the defendant. The plaintiff’s steer
won grand champion but one of the judges suspected that
air had been injected under the steer’s skin.  In stead of
following its own procedures providing for a professional
examination of the steer by a veterinarian, the defendant
had two veterinarians informally inspect the steer. The
veterinarians did not give a conclusive opinion as to
whether the steer was tampered with. The steer was sold at
the fair auction and was butchered but the defendant
informed the high bidder that it did not have to pay for the
steer. The defendant eventually disqualified the steer. The
plaintiff brought actions against the defendant for libel and
slander, breach of contract and tortious interference with a
contract. The court held that sufficient evidence was
presented that the steer was improperly disqualified because
the defendant did not follow its own rules for making a
disqualification. The court also held that the defendant
could not be held liable for libel and slander because the
communications of the disqualification were conditionally
privileged and not made with malice toward the plaintiff.
The court also held that the defendant was not liable for
tortious interference with the plaintiff’s contract with the
highest bidder because the interference was not done with
malice. Galveston County Fair & Rodeo v. Glover, 880
S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
WATER
    TRESPASS. The parties owned neighboring agricultural
land. The previous owner of one of the tracts had
constructed a stock pond and the defendant constructed a
trout pond on another portion of the property using run-off
from the stock pond to supply the trout pond. However, the
run-off to the trout pond traversed the plaintiffs’ property
along a natural shallow depression or swale. The plaintiffs
were unable to cross this swale with farm machinery and
sued for an injunction against the defendants’ discharge of
water across their property. The trial court denied the
injunction because the plaintiffs had not shown any legal
duty not to discharge the water, any negligence by the
defendants or any unlawful conduct. The appellate court
reversed, holding that negligence was not the proper issue
and that the plaintiffs had demonstrated the elements of
intentional trespass. The court held that no easements had
been created by the previous owner's construction of the
stock pond because the trout pond and overflow system had
been constructed by the defendants long after the previous
owner had sold the property. The court ordered a permanent
injunction and remanded the case for determination of
actual damages suffered by the plaintiffs. Ducham v.
Tuma, 877 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 1994).
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In re Kroy (Europe) Ltd., Kroy, Inc., 27 F.3d 367
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